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Abstract 
Genetics holds the key to understanding normal human biology and possibly many of the 
major causes of human disease and impairment. Research into human developmental genetics 
seems, therefore, to be both necessary and justified. However, such research requires the use 
of embryonic and fetal tissue obtained from spontaneous abortions and elective termination of 
pregnancy. This paper examines the arguments in favour of using tissue from elective 
terminations and the evolution of regulatory frameworks for this research. The paper argues 
that the recent statutory and regulatory reforms in the UK have not properly addressed the 
issue of ethically obtaining postimplantation human embryos for research. It is argued that the 
recent reforms have left the Polkinghorne guidelines untouched but that these are now 
unequal to the task. A practical suggestion for reform of the approach to the informing and 
consent of potential donors is offered. 
 
Introduction 
In this paper, we argue that women facing termination of pregnancy are capable of 
considering the donation of aborted tissues for research, a capacity not recognized by the 
current guidelines. We contend that women in this position are no more vulnerable to undue 
influence than in other research contexts and that they are capable of reflecting upon the 
detail of the research. Moreover, we argue that the provision of information and seeking 
consent are means of demonstrating respect for the women concerned. We shall defend this 
position while criticizing the existing approach informed by the Polkinghorne guidelines.1   
Pfeffer and Kent have previously discussed some of the ethical challenges in the use of 
human fetal tissue for research where the tissue is obtained from legal terminations of 
pregnancy.2 They particularly focus upon the specific issues of the type of donor consent 
required by regulation and the general level of transparency adopted regarding the use of this 
form of human tissue. The starting point for their analysis is also the Polkinghorne guidelines 
drawn up to address this specific subject at a time when the existing legal and regulatory 
framework was feared to be inadequate for a sensitive issue and a potentially controversial 
use of human tissue. Since that time human tissue research has become a fast-moving tidal 
zone. Scandals regarding the retention of human tissue in the UK and France have caused 
public outcry and increased public sensitivity to the uses and potential abuses of human tissue 
in research.3  The burgeoning development of human embryonic stem cell research and 
human gamete research related to both stem cells and fertility treatment have shown the 
capacity science has to outpace regulation and legislation.  
Our argument arises from our research into the ethical and governance challenges facing a 
pan-European research network, which uses human fetal tissue to study gene expression in 
early human development. In this paper, we re-visit the issues of consent and transparency, 
examine the status of fetal tissue in relation to the debates about other forms of embryonic 
tissue and discuss the arguments and justification for this form of research.  
 
Background 
The Developmental Gene Expression Map project is a design study that will generate the 
tools and framework for a research infrastructure dedicated to gene expression mapping in 
early human development.4 The project developed out of pre-existing research within the 
Institute of Human Genetics at Newcastle University, which is one of the two sites of the 
Medical Research Council– Wellcome Trust Human Developmental Biology Resource 
(HDBR)5  and our work contributes to the design of the governance framework for the 
proposed research infrastructure. 
Developmental gene expression studies seek to identify the genes that are active in particular 
locations at particular stages of human development. Such studies cannot be conducted 
without access to the developing embryo and this is only possible by using model animals, 
particularly the mouse, or by using donated tissue from women who have undergone elective 
termination of pregnancy or suffered a spontaneous abortion. Although there are many 
terminations in the UK and some tissue is collected for research on an ad hoc  basis, only the 
HDBR systematically collects and maintains this tissue for 
distribution to researchers on request. The human embryo or fetus is thus considered a scarce 
resource for scientists to work with, often described as ‘precious’.6–8 
The case for using human fetal tissue rests upon arguments that this form of research will 
have a number of important benefits, expanding the knowledge of normal human 
development with potential health benefits for human disease. Burn and Strachan6  argue that 
the 1:30 incidence of major birth defects makes a strong case for studying the action of genes 
in normal human development to provide a baseline from which understanding of abnormal 
development can be derived. Lindsay and Copp8  note the discovery that some late onset 
disorders may have their origins in fetal development and that  mapping normal development 
is a crucial step in revealing gene function and role in disease. Fougerousse et al.9  also argue 
that research on human developmental samples is justified on purely scientific grounds, since 
it is known that there are differences in expression patterns between genes in human and 
mouse and the resulting phenotypes, with an example being the genes implicated in limb 
girdle muscular dystrophy. We must also bear in mind that human embryos held in existing 
anatomical collections are inadequate for gene expression studies as preservation methods are 
such that gene products such as RNA are lost. There is thus a requirement for new collections 
to be made, and in the UK this must be done in a manner conforming to the Polkinghorne 
guidelines. 
 
The Polkinghorne Guidelines 
The first relevant regulatory framework in the UK was Sir John Peel’s published in 1972.10  
Peel’s Code of Practice on the use of fetal tissue in research recognized the need to protect a 
viable fetus outside the womb, but created a category of ‘non-viable fetus’ defined as being 
less than 20 weeks gestation. The use of the whole pre-viable fetus was permitted ‘where 
there is no known objection on the part of the parent who has had an opportunity to declare 
any wishes about the disposal of the fetus’ and there was no discussion of any requirement 
that only the dead fetus may be so used. By the mid-1980s, attempts to treat conditions such 
as Parkinson’s disease by the transplantation of neural tissue obtained from aborted fetuses 
led to concerns that the Peel Report was outdated and a committee was convened under the 
chairmanship of John Polkinghorne to reconsider the issues of the use of fetuses in research 
and therapy. It was thought that successful neural transplantation techniques would lead to an 
increased demand for tissue and could influence a woman’s decision to terminate a 
pregnancy.1  There was also a tension to be addressed between the view that Peel had on the 
availability of embryos for research and the views expressed about the status of the embryo 
by the Warnock committee in 1984.1  While Warnock recommended that no research should 
be performed on living embryos older than 14 days postfertilization, the Polkinghorne 
Committee recognized that Rule 4 of Peel’s Code of Practice permits the use of the whole 
pre-viable fetus in research. This was thus open to the  interpretation that living embryos 
beyond 14 days could be used in research, provided they were recovered from terminations. 
The Polkinghorne Committee subsequently produced a new set of guidelines and despite 
changes to other relevant areas of law such as the Human Fertility and Embryology Act 1990 
(HFE Act) and the Human Tissue Act 2004 (HT Act) these have remained the main 
regulatory guidance for the use of fetal tissue in research. 
The Polkinghorne Guidelines are structured around the following key principles: 
†  Consent to donate embryonic tissue for research must 
be obtained after a decision has been reached by the 
woman to terminate her pregnancy; 
†  The woman should be informed only of the general 
purpose to which her tissue may be put; 
†  The woman cannot specify the use to which the 
donated tissue is put; 
†  The medical team caring for the woman must not have 
any connection with the research team who may use 
the tissue; 
†  Tissue samples should be held by an intermediary and 
must be anonymous. 
A pivotal principle within the guidelines is the principle of ‘separation’, that is the separation 
of the decision to abort from the decision to donate tissue for research, and the separation of 
the researchers from the source of the tissue.1  Separation is further achieved by providing the 
potential donor with only general information regarding the nature of the research. There are 
a number of concerns which underpin this strategy but, on our reading, the single most 
serious concern for the Polkinghorne committee was that all measures ought to be taken to 
avoid any form of pressure or coercion in the decision to terminate. We contend that the 
Polkinghorne guidelines are now in need of review, to accord with the evolution of practice 
relating to consent for research. The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists11  
have expressed the view that the guidance on consent in Polkinghorne is probably illegal and 
that the separation of researchers from the source of tissue is hampering research. While this 
latter point is no reason to change matters, the former needs to be considered. Anderson et 
al.12  used their findings from empirical research conducted with women in Edinburgh to raise 
questions regarding the need for such strong principles of separation as Polkinghorne 
requires. Finally, the Polkinghorne Committee itself recognized that the guidelines were the 
product of the legislative, administrative and medical practice of the day and would require 
revision and as we shall argue, that time is now. 
We now turn to consider and challenge a number of the intuitions underpinning the 
Polkinghorne Guidelines. One issue we wish to contest is Polkinghorne’s concern that women 
considering a termination are vulnerable to coercion or influence in their decision and that a 
detailed invitation to donate to research may ‘contaminate’ the will of a woman with a 
motivation related to the research rather than her own health and wellbeing. We find this 
questionable because there is no evidence to suggest that this is a reasonable concern since 
consent for research is obtained only after the decision to terminate has already been made. In 
the case of transplantation of fetal tissues, where it was speculated that women may attempt to 
conceive in order to donate to a specific person, this had already been ruled out by the 
regulations governing transplantation. 
So, although we accept that there is a good reason to separate the decision to terminate 
pregnancy from the decision to donate tissue for research, we find that the other mechanisms 
of separation are not defensible when compared with the approaches adopted in other morally 
analogous and equally complex research contexts. It is of course true that in many research 
contexts a ‘gatekeeper’, a person not involved in the research but known to the patient, is 
often used to make the first approach to potential research subjects to allow them the 
opportunity to refuse involvement at the earliest and easiest opportunity. However, this is not 
analogous to the Polkinghorne principle of separation since the gatekeeper does inform the 
potential subject in some detail of the nature of the research about to be undertaken. There are 
of course many instances when clinicians are of necessity directly involved in the recruitment 
of research subjects. However in both the gatekeeper and the direct approach to recruitment, it 
is the research ethics committee who judges that the quality and detail of the information is 
sufficient to allow the participant to make an informed decision. 
 
An opportunity missed? 
The process leading up to the new legislation covering the use of human tissue was the 
opportune moment for a revision of the Polkinghorne Guidelines. The Department of Health 
consultation document of July 2002, Human Bodies, Human Choices ,13  contained a specific 
discussion of fetal tissue and while some aspects of the Polkinghorne Guidelines were 
thought to be questionable by the authors, others were not. The areas that were implicitly 
accepted by the authors were: 
†  The use of fetal tissue in research is ethically 
acceptable; 
†  There is a requirement for review of research using 
fetal tissue by a research ethics committee; 
†  That no form of inducement should be offered to 
donate; 
†  That consent for the termination should be given 
before any approach to consent to donate to research 
is made; 
†  That provision for conscientious objection to participation 
by medical staff be retained; 
†  The idea of an intermediary between clinicians and 
researchers is still valid, but there are legitimate 
reasons why this may be not be a requirement, provided 
REC approval is granted, as at present; 
†  That the body of the fetus and fetal tissue should not 
be the subject of property rights. 
Some aspects of the Polkinghorne Guidelines were considered for modification and these will 
be discussed below, however, the HT Act14  that emerged does not address these or any other 
issues relating to fetal tissue. Searching the text of the Act electronically reveals no instances 
of the term ‘fetus’ or its synonyms.15  Since the HT Act has not revoked or revised the 
Polkinghorne Guidelines, we believe this leaves the legal position regarding the procedures to 
be followed when collecting postimplantation fetal tissue to be unchanged and as we shall 
argue inadequate. 
The HT Act provided for the creation of the Human Tissue Authority (HTA) and gave this 
body the responsibility to provide information and guidance to those working under its 
authority. However at some point between the consultation of 2002 and the drafting of the 
code of practice on consent, the issue of fetal tissue was either forgotten or for some reason 
removed. The code of practice on consent published by the Authority in January 200616  only 
goes so far as to acknowledge the ethical sensitivity of using fetal material for research and 
suggests a requirement for consent to use this tissue. However, without directly addressing 
the use of hEFT in research, it implies that Polkinghorne remains in force. 
 
Consent or no consent? 
As noted above, some aspects of the Polkinghorne Guidelines were considered for change in 
the consultation phase for the HT Act and among them was the question of consent.13  This 
can be summarized as: 
†  If fetal tissue is being gathered for a specific project, 
then informed consent should be sought in line with 
standard practice in other areas; 
†  If the tissue is to be used for therapy then the woman 
should not be able to identify where or when it was 
used, or specify its use; 
†  If tissue is to be banked then the woman should be 
given a choice regarding whether the tissue is identifiable 
or anonymous; 
†  The potential donor should be asked whether or not 
she wishes to be contacted about future use of stored 
tissue, if it was identifiable, or told that no further 
contact will be made, if the tissue is anonymous. 
The department published a summary of the responses to the consultation,17  and although as 
with all such secondary data sources we see the results through the interpretation and (perhaps 
unconscious) prejudices of the writer, the results state that there was a consensus on many 
points, including the acceptance of the proposed revised approach to consent as outlined 
above. Furthermore, with regard to the principle of separation, the consultation responses 
indicated that there was no need for an independent intermediary, although the reasons behind 
this view were not published. 
The consultation in 2002 found that, against the expectations of those who set the questions, 
the respondents saw no need for separation and this supports the findings of Anderson et 
al.,12  so far the only published empirical research of women in the UK. In this only 8% of 
women seeking an abortion felt that the doctor should have nothing to do with the research 
while 25% of women not (then) seeking an abortion who were surveyed thought that the 
clinician and researcher should be separate. This study did not explore the reasons underlying 
the women’s responses and so, as with many other aspects of this subject, we believe there is 
a need for further qualitative empirical research. 
While the government consultation sought views on seeking a form of informed consent, 
Anderson et al.  asked only whether consent should be sought. Although 63% of all women 
surveyed in the 1994 study agreed that consent should be sought, less than half the women 
asked wanted details of the research to be undertaken. Women who had never had a 
termination were more likely to say they would want information than those who had 
previously had a termination, in the ratio of 38% against 23%.12  This appears to contradict 
the finding of the 2002 consultation where informed consent was favoured. In a further 
finding that contradicts Polkinghorne’s vision of the need for the separation of researchers 
from the source of tissue, Anderson et al. found that 54% of women who had never had a 
termination and 33% of women who had had a termination wanted to be able to ask questions 
of the researcher. With these comments in mind we now turn to consider the issues of consent 
and the quality of information that should be made available to donors. 
 The thorny issue of consent 
In fairness to the Polkinghorne Guidelines there is a definite acknowledgement of the need for 
explicit consent as stated in Chapter 6 and elsewhere in the report. This position is a marked 
improvement on that of the Peel Report, which adopted the view that tissue could be used 
where there is ‘no known objection on the part of the parents’.1 
The Peel position can be seen as a well meaning but paternalistic attempt to avoid distressing 
discussions with donors. However, although Polkinghorne insists on explicit consent it also 
requires that consent should be general in nature, without full disclosure of the nature of the 
research. We consider this position to be inadequate but acknowledge that there are a number 
of potential alternatives. We will now explore three positions and argue in favour of one 
solution. 
In the post-Bristol, post-Alder Hey era there has been a move towards a form of consent that 
is, if not fully, then adequately informed.18  In the context of research, there has been a long 
consensus since the Declaration of Geneva (1948) that the quality of the information provided 
to research participants ought to involve full or very detailed disclosure.19  It could therefore 
be regarded as a foundational principle that participation in research should be on the basis of 
voluntary and adequately informed consent, a principle echoed within the numerous local, 
national and international guidelines on participation in research.20  The General Medical 
Council20  in their guidance to doctors on research, not only insist upon sufficiently detailed 
information but disclosure in a form that is likely to be understood by the research subject. 
However, it must also be acknowledged that even under the HT Act it remains a lawful option 
to use waste tissue for research without the requirement for consent. 
The HTA are yet to issue specific guidance on the use of fetal tissue except that in 
acknowledging the sensitivity of using aborted fetal tissue they suggest that consent is 
required.16  The code of practice for consent issued by the HTA in July 2006 notes that while 
consent lies at the heart of the HT Act there are exceptions to this, one of which is the use of 
tissue in research. No consent from the patient is required for the storage and use of their 
tissues providing that the research has ethical approval and that the tissue is anonymized. In 
recognizing the fetus as the woman’s tissue, and thus involving a living donor, a legal 
argument could be made for the nonconsensual use of tissue recovered from abortion. It is 
acknowledged, however, that obtaining consent represents best practice in acquiring tissue 
and is preferable to anonymization and non-consensual use. 
Since the HT Act and the HTA codes of practice have left the Polkinghorne Guidelines as the 
regulatory framework for obtaining embryonic and fetal tissue for research, there is clearly a 
disjunction between the principles of appropriate consent on which the Act was founded and 
actual practices permitted by the HTA regarding fetal tissue. How can consent be informed if 
the Polkinghorne Guidelines prevent the woman from knowing what research, if any, is 
proposed? The possibility that fetal tissue may be used in genetic research or in the creation 
of cell lines makes the case for informed and possible conditional consent more pressing 
because of the acknowledged complexities of research involving genetic information and 
which has potential health implications for the donor and other family members.21 
There are three possible positions with regard to consent. 
No consent required 
The idea that no consent is required for the use of fetal tissue following legal termination is 
premised on a number of established practices and intuitions. For example, the practice of 
utilizing tissue normally disposed of following a surgical intervention. The idea that some 
human tissue can be rightfully described as ‘waste’ or ‘surplus’ fits with a number of moral 
arguments, which have been developed as ways of dissolving if not resolving several complex 
moral problems. These range from pro-abortion arguments to the arguments used to defend 
embryonic research of all kinds by showing that embryos and similar ‘tissues’ lack moral 
significance.22 – 24  From these perspectives, it is concluded that ‘no moral significance’ means 
‘no moral problem’. 
General consent 
The model advocated by the Polkinghorne Guidelines is an approach to consent that is one of 
the strategies of separation, which Polkinghorne sees as essential to prevent any form of 
coercion or undue influence on the woman’s decision to have a termination. In principle, this 
approach is compatible with English common law approaches to consent in which the quality 
and nature of the information to be disclosed is a matter of professional judgement rather than 
based on what the patient wishes to know.25 However, the legal position has only been 
defined in relation to consent to treatment whereas the thrust of ethical guidance on research 
insist upon a high standard of disclosure and information as discussed above. Polkinghorne’s 
insistence on the separation principle as necessary is confusing, since if consent to donate to 
research is always post a valid consent to terminate the pregnancy then in what way could the 
second decision be said to influence the first? We suggest that the Polkinghorne Guidelines 
are a symptom of traditional paternalistic attitudes, which display bad faith towards the 
women facing this decision. 
Adequately informed consent – the Helsinki model 
The third approach is that of adequately informed consent where the quality and detail of the 
information is specific and in a form likely to be understood by the person who is to give their 
consent. At a bare minimum this should include the risks involved and some material detail of 
the potential research or clinical use of the tissue and the reasons why such research is 
justified. The implications for the woman that may result from any genetic analysis on the 
embryo should also be made clear, although this will be dependant on the approach to 
anonymization taken by the researchers. The current collection of material in the Hopital 
Necker in Paris, for example, uses a link-anonymized approach while the HDBR in the UK 
holds anonymous tissue.26  Another aspect of the contemporary approach to research ethics is 
the right of the individual to withdraw from a study. For example, this is the case in the UK 
for embryo donation to stem cell research where there is a right to withdraw up to the point at 
which the embryo is in the possession of the researcher in the laboratory. 27  The requirement 
for the anonymous donation of tissue under the Polkinghorne Guidelines means that once 
donated, samples can never be withdrawn. Again, there is an incongruity with the code of 
practice on consent issued by the HTA where paragraph 66 notes that consent should be 
sought for donation of fetal tissue but paragraph 107 states that ‘a competent person is 
entitled to withdraw consent at any time’.16 
 
A contemporary approach 
In considering a contemporary approach to regulating the donation of fetal tissue to research 
then one solution might lie in the adoption of a ‘no requirement for consent’ model. This 
would be one way in which the woman’s decision to terminate could be perfectly insulated 
from potential inducement. Such an approach would also be consistent with the HT Act, 
which allows the anonymous use of surplus tissue in research and research tissue banks. To 
deny this solution requires a careful unpicking of the sensitivities presumed to attach to these 
specific tissues obtained in this specific way. Such explanations are not forthcoming, either 
within the Act or within the Polkinghorne Guidelines. 
The alternative is to adopt a standard that requires adequately informed consent at the level 
usually required for participation in other forms of research. Indeed the HTA uses the term 
‘appropriate consent’ throughout the codes of practice issued to date.28 
 As discussed earlier, there is scant empirical evidence on which to base any firm suggestion 
for an approach to the reform of the Polkinghorne Guidelines. However, revision of consent 
was considered in the consultation leading to the HT Act and it is a matter for future research 
to uncover the reasons why not only was this suggestion not taken forward when it was 
supported by the majority of respondents, but also why the whole issue of fetal tissue was 
omitted from the Act.  
The other aspect of the principle of separation apparent in the Polkinghorne Guidelines is that 
of the clear lack of connection between the clinicians and the researchers. Anderson et al.  
found that the women they surveyed saw no need for this separation with at most 25% of 
women thinking this desirable and this finding was supported by the consultation before the 
drafting of the Human Tissue Bill.17  In considering the practicalities of the separation of 
clinician from researcher, it is clear that there must be some form of contact, for agreeing the 
processes for taking consent and the methods of collection of the tissue and its storage and 
transport. It is thus unrealistic, and perhaps counter-productive, to continue to insist upon a 
separation of researchers from those providing care for a woman who requests a termination. 
 
Conclusion  
This is a complex and changing field in which we have demonstrated the need to re-think and 
reform the current guidelines. In our view, the ‘no consent’ approach to fetal tissue should not 
be adopted. We believe that the adequately informed consent model ought to be adopted in 
the context of a specific set of guidelines issued by the appropriate authority. This may 
include a change to the primary legislation by reform of the HT Act, or perhaps more 
straightforwardly by the issuing of specific guidance from the HT Authority. 
The model of adequately informed consent not only reflects an ethic of respect for persons it 
also coheres with the general presumption in favour of informed consent, considered to be the 
basic premise of contemporary research ethics. We do not claim to have successfully 
unpicked the thorny issue of the moral status of the fetus, there is clearly a need for further 
empirical and conceptual research in this area. Conceptual research may go some way to 
developing an account of the status of the fetus vis-a-vis  the mother’s tissues useful for 
regulation and guidance. However, the moral status of the embryo and fetus is likely to 
remain ambiguous since it is characterized by multivalency between the different contexts in 
which issues arise. This observation alone suggests the need for caution rather than bold 
stances when formulating regulation. Empirical research in this field may also contribute to 
exploring the effectiveness and acceptability of practice.  
Finally, the possibility that fetal tissue may be used in transplantation, genetic and cell-line 
research, each with its attendant moral complexity, again suggests that women asked to 
donate should have enough information to be able to consider the implications of their 
decision and be offered the possibility of conditional consent and future withdrawal. 
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